Viettel holds 65.66%, and the structure stops there

CTR is a subsidiary of the Military Industry – Telecommunications Group with a 65.66% ownership stake; below it sit only two small, 100%-owned overseas subsidiaries, so this record is not a holding-company case and doesn’t require a sum-of-the-parts breakdown.

At the 30/06/2026 record date, Viettel Group held 75,107,745 shares, corresponding to 65.66% of charter capital^[1]. The only other major shareholder is Mr. Đoàn Hồng Việt with 5,714,000 shares (4.995%) — just under the 5% disclosure threshold, and this ratio has held steady since November 2024. The entire Board of Directors, Board of Management, and Supervisory Board combined hold 0.15% of capital.

The two subsidiaries — Viettel Construction Cambodia and Viettel Construction Myanmar — both do construction, installation, and telecom infrastructure operation in their host markets^[2]. The contributed capital is tiny relative to the revenue contribution: combined, USD 102.6 million in 2025 revenue, equivalent to about VND 2,686 billion at the reference rate of VND 26,179/USD, on a capital base of only USD 160 thousand. The gap between consolidated revenue (VND 13,939.5 billion) and parent-company revenue (VND 11,934 billion) is VND 2,005.5 billion, roughly matching this contribution after intercompany eliminations.

The legal representative is Mr. Phạm Đình Trường, Board Member and CEO, in office since October 2018. The Chairman of the Board is Mr. Đỗ Mạnh Hùng. There were no management personnel changes in 2025^[2]. This is notable for a rapidly expanding company: a stable management team throughout the growth period.

Four business pillars, and the single largest customer is the parent company

CTR sells four things that are economically different in nature — contract-based operations services, progress-based construction, asset-based infrastructure leasing, and retail technical solutions — of which network operations remains the revenue backbone while infrastructure leasing is the value backbone.

The company names four fields: Network Operations, Construction, Leased Infrastructure Investment, and Technical Solutions & Services^[2]. The basic unit economics of each segment are entirely different, which is why the consolidated margin can’t be read as a single number.

Source: 2025 Annual Report^[2]. The network-operations station count belongs to the investors/owners, distinct from the 12,000 towers CTR itself owns.

The most recent three years no longer disclose revenue structure by pillar. The 2024 and 2025 Annual Reports state each segment’s revenue in words and operating metrics, but don’t re-present a value table as in the prior two years. This is a Tier 5 gap: there is insufficient basis to break out 2024 and 2025 revenue contributions by segment, and any statement about which segment pulled the margin down in those two years is speculation.

What can still be tracked is dependence on the parent company. Revenue from partners outside Viettel reached VND 5,804 billion in 2025, 41% of total revenue, up from 39.7% in 2024^[2]. Read the other way: 59% of revenue still comes from the Viettel ecosystem. In 2025, CTR signed 5,083 contracts with the Group, total value VND 3,629.1 billion, all below the 35%-of-total-assets threshold, so none required separate presentation to the AGM.

Timeline 2020–2026: two changes of trajectory

This period has two fundamental turning points — moving exchanges from UPCoM to HOSE in February 2022 opened up an institutional capital channel, and entering the leased-infrastructure investment cycle from 2022 shifted CTR from a service contractor to an asset investor.

Source: company disclosures on record dates and additional listings^[1], cross-checked against annual reports^[2][3][4][5]. Bold = the two structural turning points.

What’s notable about this timeline is what doesn’t appear: over seven years, there hasn’t been a single cash-raising share offering to existing shareholders or a strategic investor. Every capital increase since 2019 has been a stock dividend, a bonus issue, or one small ESOP round. The company has expanded its assets nearly threefold in five years without calling in a single dong of new equity capital — the shortfall was funded by retained earnings and bank credit.

The 2024 Annual Report notes that the Board of Directors had “studied a capital-raising plan to secure funding for production and business activities,” and this repeats in the 2025 outlook^[5]. By the 2025 report, that plan is no longer mentioned. There is insufficient basis to conclude whether the company has abandoned it or merely postponed it.

Foreign room remains very wide, and foreign investors just pulled out a large round

CTR’s foreign ownership cap is 49% but only 5.53% is actually used, so room has never been the constraint; what’s worth reading is that foreign capital flow has reversed sharply — net selling of VND 619.6 billion in 2025, wiping out nearly all the net buying accumulated over the previous six years.

Source: 2025 Annual Report^[2]. Foreign ownership as of 20/08/2026 per market data is 5.53% (7,079,774 shares), against a 49% cap^[1].

The 2025 net-selling round coincided with the sharpest price decline year of the period. The 2025 price return was −29.8% while the VN-Index rose 40.9%, a 70.7-percentage-point underperformance, ranking 97th in the tracked group^[1]. The two events coincide in timing; disclosed data doesn’t allow distinguishing cause from effect.

Which funds hold it

Among traceable fund portfolios, CTR appears in two large domestic funds: the VinaCapital Strategic Growth Equity Fund (VESAF) as of 31/07/2026, and Dragon Capital’s Vietnam Dynamic Fund (DCDS) as of the same date. Funds checked that do not hold CTR include VEIL (Dragon Capital), VMEEF (VinaCapital), SSI-SCA, and the VanEck Vietnam ETF.

CTR is not in the VN30 basket and not in VNDIAMOND, so there’s no mandatory passive flow from the two largest index-fund groups in the market. Combined with one-month average matched liquidity of VND 24.0 billion per session (327,835 shares), this is a stock where an institutional position of several hundred billion dong would take many weeks to build or exit.

Profit converts to cash, and to more cash than the profit itself

Operating cash flow exceeded profit after tax in four of five years, reaching VND 1,455.4 billion in 2025 against profit of VND 599.7 billion — the three-year (2023–2025) average cash-realization ratio is 1.88×, and the excess comes from depreciation and working capital, not from unusual items.

Red = negative value or below the 0.7× warning threshold. Free cash flow = operating cash flow minus capex.

Capex peaked at VND 800.8 billion in 2024 then fell sharply to VND 369.6 billion in 2025 — the 2025 spend is only VND 14.9 billion above depreciation. As a rough approximation, nearly all 2025 capex was just enough for maintenance, with no expansion left over. This is the direct reason free cash flow jumped to VND 1,085.8 billion, 3.2 times the prior year. The 2026 plan targets 1,000 new BTS towers, half the 2,000-tower pace of 2025, indicating the capital-heavy phase has passed its peak.

The “other income” component isn’t a problem in this record: it was slightly negative for four straight years and only positive VND 18.4 billion in 2025, equal to 2.5% of profit before tax — well below the 20% threshold that would warrant a question. Net financial difference, i.e. financial income minus interest expense, is also small: positive VND 6.8 billion in 2025 and negative VND 11.8 billion in 2024, under 2% of profit before tax. CTR’s profit is core profit.

Charter capital rose 5.4-fold in sixteen years without a single capital call

From VND 238 billion at equitization in 2010 to VND 1,281.1 billion after the July 2026 stock dividend, of twelve total capital increases only exactly one was a cash-raising offering — in 2016 — with the rest being stock dividends, bonus shares, and one ESOP round.

Yellow = cash payout ratio exceeding 70% of profit. The 2022 dividend comprises two tranches: VND 1,000/share record-dated 29/06/2023 and VND 1,919/share record-dated 18/01/2024. EPS is the original reported figure on each year’s average share count, not retrospectively adjusted for stock dividends — don’t use this series to compare profit trends.

The dividend policy has changed direction clearly. The three years 2022–2024 saw very heavy cash payouts, peaking at VND 525.4 billion actually paid in 2024 — higher than that year’s profit after tax. From fiscal 2025, the cash rate dropped to VND 1,500 per share, equal to 29% of profit, offset by a 12% stock dividend. The Board’s five-year outlook is to maintain cash dividends of 10–15% of par combined with stock^[2]. The 2025 profit distribution splits into 45.5% dividends, 29.5% to the development investment fund, and 25.0% to the reward and welfare fund, on a total of VND 540.8 billion.

The domestic number-one position is real, but measurable in exactly one segment

CTR owned 12,000 BTS towers at end-2025, versus the closest competitor the company names, OCK, with 3,240 towers — the position as Vietnam’s number-one TowerCo is a well-grounded conclusion; in the other three segments, market share hasn’t been measured by any independent source.

Three levels: well-grounded = has third-party cross-check data; self-reported = only company sources; unmeasured = no market denominator.

CTR’s real competitive advantage lies in two places, and both are hard to replicate. First is the relationship with the parent company: 59% of revenue comes from the Viettel ecosystem, providing a stable revenue base no competitor can access — but this is also the largest customer-concentration risk in the record. Second is the physical network: 34 branches and 332 business centers covering the whole country, plus a workforce of over 10,000 field technicians. For on-site technical services, presence density is a barrier to entry — a competitor wanting to compete would have to rebuild that entire network.

The 2030 strategic target is stated in two different versions within the same 2025 Annual Report: the development-orientation section states total revenue of VND 28,790 billion with 15.6% average growth and profit before tax of VND 1,315 billion; the Board of Directors’ assessment section states VND 25,071 billion with 12% average growth and profit before tax of VND 1,050 billion^[2]. A gap of VND 3,719 billion in revenue and VND 265 billion in profit between two pages of the same document. There is insufficient basis to determine which figure is the official plan.

Receivables quality is the sole weak point deteriorating continuously

The provision-to-customer-receivables ratio went from 0.13% in 2021 to 8.38% in 2025 and 9.31% as of 30/06/2026 — while every other operating metric improved, this is the sole line moving the wrong way, and it points squarely at the quality of investors/clients in the construction segment outside the Group.

Red = deteriorating metric. Turnover is calculated on the average of beginning- and end-of-period balances. Cash conversion cycle = days sales outstanding plus days inventory outstanding minus days payables outstanding.

This table holds two opposing stories. The cash conversion cycle narrowed 19.4 days from 2023 to 2025, and the source of improvement is inventory rather than stretching supplier payment terms — days inventory fell 13.4 days while days payables also fell 4.5 days. This is a genuine operating improvement, not shifting the burden onto partners.

But at the same time, bad-debt provision rose from VND 90.8 billion (2024) to VND 153.9 billion (2025) then VND 190.4 billion as of 30/06/2026. The additional VND 63.1 billion provisioned in 2025 concentrates on a newly appearing customer — Vietnam Construction Trading Corporation, a balance of VND 32.8 billion, 100% provisioned in the very first year it was recorded^[2].

Source: 2025 Annual Report^[2]. The six largest customers are all 100% provisioned, meaning the company treats them as a total loss.

The customer list tells the nature of the problem: FLC Faros, Delta – Valley Binh Thuan, Da Lat Valley, Indochina IDC are all real-estate developers. CTR’s receivables risk is developer-quality risk in the construction segment outside the Group, not a risk of the infrastructure or network-operations segments. This is also precisely the segment the company is pushing to reduce dependence on the parent — the two goals pull against each other.

Data quality and governance

The auditor is AASC Auditing Firm Co., Ltd. for both 2024 and 2025, chosen by the Board of Directors under authority delegated by the AGM^[2][5]. The 2022 Annual Report explicitly states “unqualified audit opinion,” with no qualification^[4]. The 2024 and 2025 audit opinions have not been read directly within the scope of this document — this is an untraced Tier B metric, and any conclusion about the data set’s reliability must carry that limitation.

Related-party transactions are large in scale but transparent in mechanism: 5,083 contracts with Viettel Group in 2025, total value VND 3,629.1 billion, all below the 35%-of-total-assets threshold and approved per the proposal passed at the AGM. No related-party loans or guarantees appear on the balance sheet. Insider trading during the surveyed period was mostly buying, small in scale — 10,000 to 100,000 shares per transaction, concentrated in 2020–2021.

Headcount fell from 10,581 at end-2024 to an average of 10,169 in 2025, with 1,125 departures during the year, an 11% turnover rate. Revenue-based labor productivity reached VND 1,159 million per person, up 20% from VND 965 million in 2024. For a company where personnel cost is a large component of cost of goods sold, this is a turnover metric worth watching in place of asset turnover.

The market is pricing a scenario of margins not recovering

The current P/E of 14.97× sits exactly 13.1% below the five-year median of 17.22×, after the stock fell 29.8% in 2025 and traded flat in 2026 — this discount roughly matches the 13.5% relative compression in EBIT margin, meaning the market has already priced in most of what this document found.

Green = outperformed the index or a price gain; red = underperformed the index or a price decline. 2026* is through 19/08/2026. Rank is by return within the tracked group. Source: adjusted closing prices on HOSE and UPCoM^[1].

Seven of eight years CTR outperformed the VN-Index, and the sole losing year is 2025 — underperforming by 70.7 percentage points, exactly the year margins clearly compressed and foreign investors sold VND 619.6 billion net. The current technical strength score is 74 out of 100, ranking in the 82.7th percentile among 1,513 rated tickers.

What the market is assuming. With a market cap of VND 9,800 billion and trailing-12-month profit after tax of VND 654.5 billion, the 14.97× P/E implies the market doesn’t expect margins to return to the 2021–2022 range. H1 2026 results haven’t refuted that assumption: revenue rose 33.2% year-on-year but profit after tax rose only 20.5%, and gross margin fell a further 0.75 percentage points. Six-month profit reached 51.7% of the 2026 plan — on pace, but that plan itself already sets profit-after-tax growth of only 3.8% on 11.4% revenue growth. The company itself is planning for a year of continued margin thinning.

Revenue of VND 13,940 billion, up 10.55%. Profit after tax of VND 599.7 billion, up 11.43%. The profit-after-tax growth rate exceeding the revenue growth rate shows the Corporation is improving cost-control efficiency and raising its profit margin.

2025 Annual Report, Financial Analysis section — the company’s own characterization

The statement above is arithmetically correct for 2025 alone and wrong about the four-year trend. 2025 net margin is 4.30%, higher than 2024’s 4.27% but lower than 2021’s 5.04%. If the comparison point is one year, margin has improved; if the comparison point is the investment cycle, it’s still thinning. Which baseline you choose is which conclusion you get — and that’s why this document’s numbering rule requires every figure to carry its baseline.