§ 01 — POSITIONINGVPX is a securities firm almost entirely controlled by a bank

Vietnam Prosperity Joint Stock Commercial Bank holds 79.96% of capital; free-float shares are only 20%; the company has no subsidiaries at all, so the entire analysis runs on standalone financial statements.

The company’s predecessor was Asia Securities Joint Stock Company (ASC), established under License No. 106/UBCK-GP dated 08 Apr 2009, with initial charter capital of VND 36 billion. On 26 May 2022, after being acquired by VPBank, the company was renamed VPBank Securities Joint Stock Company.^[1][3] Ticker VPX was listed on HOSE on 11 Dec 2025.^[1]

Licensed activities include brokerage, proprietary trading, underwriting, custody, investment advisory, margin trading and advances against securities sale proceeds.^[1] Headquarters at Floors 21 and 25, 89 Lang Ha Tower, Dong Da Ward, Hanoi. Headcount at 31 Dec 2024 was 582.^[1]

Source: note 10 of the interim financial statements at 30 Jun 2026 and updated shareholder structure.^[2][6] Foreign ownership ratio as of 28 Aug 2026. The investment in the crypto asset exchange grew from VND 2.75 bn to VND 1,100 bn during H1 2026.

A point worth recording right at the positioning stage: the company has no subsidiaries or associates whatsoever. Both long-term investments sit at 11% — below the threshold for significant influence — so they are recorded at cost and not consolidated. As a result, every figure in this document is a standalone figure, with no non-controlling interests to strip out.

§ 02 — TIMELINEFour years split into three phases: building capital, building the organization, building the balance sheet

2022–2023 injected capital and built the organization but did not yet use leverage; borrowing began in 2024; 2025 is the year the balance sheet truly expanded, and the December 2025 IPO marks the shift from a bank’s subsidiary to a listed public company.

Source: 2022, 2023, 2024 and 2025 annual reports and the interim financial statements at 30 Jun 2026; disclosures on HOSE.^{[1][2][3][4][5][6]} Leverage = liabilities divided by period-end equity. The 2021 figure belongs to the predecessor entity, ASC.

Unit: VND billion. Source: audited annual financial statements and the reviewed statements at 30 Jun 2026.^{[1][2][3][4][5]} Color in this chart classifies line items and carries no up/down signal. The gap between the assets bar and the equity bar is exactly the borrowed portion — it only truly widens from 2025.

§ 03 — THE 2025 IPOAn IPO that raised VND 12,713 billion at a price the market has not since confirmed

The company sold 375 million shares at VND 33,900, netting VND 12,619 billion and nearly doubling equity; nine months after listing, the share price sat 22.6% below the offer price.

Source: note 22 of the audited 2025 financial statements, listing disclosures and price data.^[1][5][6]

By the company’s own description, this offering was the largest public offering in the history of any Vietnamese securities company.^[1] The proceeds show up directly on the balance sheet: year-end 2025 equity reached VND 33,831 billion, second in the sector after TCX.

One sequencing detail is worth recording as-is, without a causal inference. The offering resolution is dated 03 Sep 2025. Q3 2025 was the single most abnormal profit quarter in the company’s history: profit after tax of VND 1,892 billion, equal to 53% of full-year 2025, of which FVTPL trading gains reached VND 1,387 billion and financial advisory revenue reached VND 685 billion — both the highest of any quarter observed.^[6] Public disclosure does not allow a distinction between ordinary business developments and their coincidence with a single time window; this is a sequencing observation, not sufficient grounds to conclude a causal relationship.

Source: quarterly results.^[6] Q4 2025 and Q1–Q2 2026 are figures already audited or reviewed at the annual/interim level; the other quarters are company self-prepared figures. The two vertical lines are event markers, drawn in a neutral tone since they mark timing rather than carrying an up/down signal. Grey bars are the quarters before the offering plan was launched.

§ 04 — OWNERSHIPForeign room is fully open at 100%, but foreign investors are actually pulling out

Securities companies are not in a foreign-ownership-restricted line of business, so the ceiling is 100%; the actual ratio has fallen from 5.41% at year-end 2025 to 4.069% per updated data, with cumulative net selling of VND 979.4 billion since listing.

Source: Shareholder structure and changes in owners’ invested capital section of the 2025 annual report, and updated ownership data.^[1][6] Red marks a decrease from the prior period. The first seven rows are disclosed as-is; the two “18 remaining domestic institutions” rows are this document’s own subtraction (1,654,552,016 − 1,499,306,000). Board, Supervisory Board and Management Board members hold no shares in the company and had no share transactions during 2025.^[1] The last row is taken from the latest ownership update; the accompanying major-shareholder record carries a disclosure date of 30 Jun 2026 and an update date of 03 Aug 2026, so the exact timing of the 4.069% ratio cannot be determined from the source — see the cross-check below.

Two independent sources produce a reasonable average price, so the figure of 76,302,489 shares is an updated figure close to the data cut-off, not a stale one.^[1][6] This check has a limitation: foreign capital flow is measured by transaction value, while ownership changes also include off-exchange transfers, so the two quantities only match approximately.

Unit: VND billion. Source: annual foreign capital-flow data.^[6] Red here signals net selling, consistent with the document’s overall color convention. This data combines both order-matched and put-through trades, so active selling cannot be separated from pre-arranged transfers.

Three takeaways. First, free-float shares are only 20%, equal to 375 million shares — exactly the amount issued in the IPO. Second, there is no major shareholder besides VPBank; the largest individual shareholder recorded in ownership data holds 9,538,860 shares, equal to 0.509%.^[6] Third, the fact that management holds no shares eliminates insider-trading risk but also means leadership’s interests are not tied to the share price through direct ownership.

§ 06 — PORTFOLIOMore than half the investment portfolio has no market price to check against

Unlisted bonds within the FVTPL bucket reached VND 18,138 billion at 30 Jun 2026 — 61.6% of the FVTPL portfolio and 20.4% of total assets — and fair value is recorded at exactly cost across all three observation dates, i.e., no revaluation difference has arisen.

Source: notes 7.1, 7.4, 7.5, 7.6 of the 2025 financial statements and notes 7.1, 7.2, 7.4 of the interim statements at 30 Jun 2026.^[1][2] Amber marks the line item to watch. The “no observable price” row combines unlisted bonds, unlisted shares and capital contributions to economic entities. It excludes certificates of deposit, since the credit risk there belongs to a different credit institution in nature, and excludes fund units of VND 35.1 bn, since open-end funds disclose net asset value periodically.

Unit: VND billion. Source: portfolio disclosures for each period.^[1][2] Only amber carries a meaning — the group needing the closest watching, a convention kept consistent across every chart in this document. The remaining groups are distinguished by shade only, not by hue.

Earnings quality: the unrealized component has become significant

A securities company’s income statement splits profit into realized and unrealized. In 2025, unrealized profit reached VND 610.7 billion — 13.6% of profit before tax — versus minus VND 3.3 billion in 2024.^[1] Q4 2025 alone contributed VND 593.7 billion of that. Moving into Q1 2026, this item reversed to minus VND 250.2 billion before returning to positive VND 11.1 billion in Q2.^[6]

Alongside this is movement in other comprehensive income — the AFS revaluation component that flows straight to equity without passing through the income statement. In 2025 this item was positive VND 239.2 billion, taking total comprehensive income to VND 3,808.3 billion, 6.7% above profit after tax. H1 2026 went the other way: negative VND 296.9 billion, pulling total comprehensive income down to VND 1,871.7 billion, 13.7% below profit after tax.^[2][6]

Source: quarterly results.^[6] Green and red on the vertical bar signal whether other comprehensive income was positive or negative that quarter — this convention applies to every quarter with a difference large enough to plot.

The source of this swing is traceable. The year-end 2025 AFS portfolio held VND 717 billion at cost of listed shares bought in a private placement completed on 24 Jun 2025, subject to a one-year transfer restriction, revalued up by VND 343.5 billion.^[1] Of that, VND 239 billion at cost belonged to an investor under a cooperative-investment contract, offset in a payable account. By 30 Jun 2026, the cooperative-investment portion had been settled and the remainder, at a cost of VND 865.0 billion, carried a book value of only VND 805.0 billion — flipping from a gain to a loss.^[2]

Assessment: VPX’s reported profit contains a revaluation component large enough to distort the shape of the time series, and that component is concentrated in a handful of positions rather than spread across many. This thesis would be wrong if upcoming periods show the net revaluation difference staying within a narrow band with no single position accounting for more than a quarter of the swing. What the market already knows: both figures sit in public reports, so this is not undisclosed information — it is simply the correct reading of an already-published series.

§ 08 — BONDSThe company is a bond distributor and investor, not yet a bond issuer

As of 30 Jun 2026, the balance sheet contains no self-issued bond line at all; the 2025 private placement plan was halted on 29 Dec 2025, and the public bond offering dossier was only approved by the Board of Directors at the end of July 2026.

Unit: VND billion. Source: balance sheet and portfolio notes for each period; business-operations section of the 2025 annual report.^[1][4] The 2024 transaction value is inferred from the 31% increase the company discloses for 2025 — this is an inferred figure, not a directly disclosed one.

The sequence of issuance decisions is worth recording: on 29 Dec 2025, the company announced it was halting its 2025 private bond issuance plan — just eighteen days after listing and right after receiving VND 12,713 billion in IPO proceeds. Seven months later, on 28–29 Jul 2026, the Board of Directors approved matters relating to a public bond offering and approved the registration dossier.^[5] The shift from a private to a public channel coincides with a period of sharply rising funding needs — short-term borrowings rose by VND 15,078 billion in H1 2026.

There is not yet sufficient basis to conclude on the size, tenor or interest rate of this offering: the Board resolution was disclosed only as a title with an attached file, and the detailed content cannot be traced within the scope of this document. This is a line item to watch at the next disclosure period.

§ 09 — MARKET SHAREBrokerage market share went from 0.6% to 3.21% in three years, but the segment does not yet feed itself

In Q4 2025 the company entered the HOSE brokerage top 10 for the first time with 3.21%; in Q1 2026 it ranked 9th with 2.94%. At the same time, 2025 brokerage revenue of VND 460 billion was lower than brokerage operating expense of VND 471 billion.

Unit: VND billion unless noted otherwise. Source: business-operations sections of annual reports and quarterly results.^{[1][3][4][5][6]} Four notes. One: the 2022 account count is the number opened during the year per the original disclosure, taken as roughly equal to the cumulative count since the company effectively started from zero; the 2023 annual report instead cites a 455% increase from 2022, implying a base of about 45 thousand — the two presentations differ by about 5 thousand accounts. Two: the 2024 account count is inferred by subtraction, 1,144,508 − 684,480. Three: 2024 market share has two figures, both company-disclosed — the 2024 annual report states 2% at year-end, while the 2025 annual report states about 1.6% for full-year 2024 and marks it as an estimate; this table uses the 2% year-end figure to share the same basis as the 3.21% Q4 2025 figure. Four: the company discloses estimated full-year-2025 average market share at 2.47%.

Source: company disclosures in annual reports and 2026 AGM materials.^[1][3][4][5] The Q1 2026 loan bar is the company’s disclosed “over VND 36,000 bn” figure, drawn dashed to mark it as a rounded number. Both the bar and line are drawn in a neutral tone since these are two scale quantities, not up/down signals.

Competitive position: strong on capital, thin on distribution

Measurable strengths: equity of VND 35,703 billion, second in the sector, allowing about VND 32,000 billion of remaining margin-lending headroom per the company’s Q1 2026 disclosure.^[5] Average cost of funds for 2025, calculated from the statements, is 6.40%; the company discloses 4.7%.^[1] The gap between the two figures comes from the denominator: this document’s method divides interest expense by the simple average of the opening and closing loan balance, while the balance grew mostly toward year-end, so the simple average is lower than the true time-weighted average balance. Both figures are correct under their own definition.

Measurable weaknesses: 2025 brokerage revenue per account was about VND 402 thousand — VND 460.3 billion divided by 1.145 million accounts. Brokerage operating expense has exceeded brokerage revenue in each of the last four years. The retail segment is being run as a channel for attracting margin balances and assets under management rather than as a standalone profit center.

On plans: the AGM held on 20 Apr 2026 approved a 2026 target of about VND 50,000 billion in margin loans outstanding, 4.8% HOSE market share, 8.5% derivatives market share and 1.6 million accounts.^[5] If achieved, a 4.8% share would place the company among the top five. As of the data cut-off, H1 results show profit before tax of VND 2,673 billion — 41.4% of the full-year plan of VND 6,453 billion, while revenue of VND 6,969 billion already reached 62.9% of the full-year plan of VND 11,074 billion.^[2][6]

§ 10 — SAFETYThe capital adequacy ratio is far from the warning threshold, but market risk is 82% of total risk

At 30 Jun 2026, available capital of VND 33,838 billion against a total risk value of VND 7,731 billion gives a ratio of 437.73%, 2.4 times the 180% warning threshold; but VND 6,317 billion of that total risk comes from the investment portfolio.

Unit: VND billion. Source: the reviewed financial-safety-ratio report at 30 Jun 2026 and the key-financial-indicators section of each annual report.^[3][4][7] Green marks a level far exceeding the safety threshold. Three notes. One: annual reports call this metric the “capital adequacy ratio,” while the reviewed report calls it the “available-capital ratio” — the same ratio under Circular 91; this table uses the name from the legal instrument. Two: the 2022 figure was disclosed twice, differently — the 2022 annual report states 624%, the 2023 annual report states 623% for the same date; this table uses the 623% later disclosure. Three: the risk composition is disclosed only for the 30 Jun 2026 period within this document’s scope; the audited financial-safety-ratio report at 31 Dec 2025 was disclosed on 17 Mar 2026 but its content could not be traced — this is a data gap, not a value of zero.

Unit: VND billion unless noted otherwise. Source: balance sheets for each period and the key-financial-indicators section of annual reports.^{[1][2][3][4][5]} Amber marks a metric worth questioning. The provision for loan impairment stayed unchanged at VND 161.6 billion from 31 Dec 2025 to 30 Jun 2026 while the loan balance grew by VND 4,084 billion, so the provision ratio fell because of the denominator, not because of additional provisioning.

Three observations. First, margin loans outstanding relative to equity stand at 1.07x, still far from the regulatory ceiling of 2x — meaningful growth headroom remains by this metric. Second, the current ratio has fallen steadily from 23.68x to 1.65x over four years; this is the natural consequence of moving from a capital-surplus state to a leveraged state, not a sign of weakening. Third, an unchanged provision balance while the loan balance grew 12% is a point to watch at the next reporting period.

§ 11 — COMPARISONVPX and TCX share a model but classify their portfolios in opposite ways

The two companies hold a similar position: subsidiaries of a private joint-stock commercial bank, listed seven weeks apart in late 2025, both running margin loans of roughly one times equity. The decisive difference is that TCX classifies 87.2% of its portfolio as available-for-sale, while VPX classifies 91.8% as recognized through profit or loss — so the two companies’ profit-after-tax figures are not directly comparable.

Unit: VND billion unless noted otherwise. Source: 2025 financial statements of both companies and valuation data at 28 Aug 2026.^[1][6] Amber marks the metric on which VPX is in the position that most needs watching; this rule applies to every row in the table. Two caveats about comparison basis. One: TCX’s market share is the full-year-2025 disclosed figure, while VPX’s is the Q4 2025 figure — two different time bases, not directly comparable. Two: profitability metrics calculated on period-end figures artificially widen the gap between the two companies, since VND 12,619 billion of VPX’s IPO capital only entered the balance sheet in the final weeks of the year; the row calculated on the average basis is the one to use for comparison.

Source: 2025 financial statements of both companies and valuation data.^[1][6] Color here distinguishes the two entities and carries no signal.

How to read these four differences

Portfolio classification. TCX classifies almost its entire portfolio as available-for-sale, yet other comprehensive income was only VND 12.4 billion — meaning that portfolio is mostly debt instruments held near cost, with gains realized through trading rather than revaluation. VPX does the opposite: its portfolio is carried through profit or loss, so revaluation flows straight into profit, generating VND 611 billion of unrealized profit in 2025, then minus VND 250 billion in Q1 2026. The practical result: VPX’s quarterly profit swings more sharply with market movements, while TCX’s profit is flatter but the volatility sits in equity instead.

Leverage and funding. VPX uses higher leverage (1.16x versus 0.83x) and all of it is short-term. TCX already has VND 3,014 billion of self-issued bonds, split evenly between short- and long-term. This gap is exactly what VPX is trying to narrow with the public bond offering it is preparing.

Distribution channel. TCX’s 2025 full-year brokerage market share was 7.99%, ranking 3rd on HOSE; VPX’s best quarter was 3.21%. This gap reflects the time difference: TCX has operated since 2008, while VPX effectively restarted in 2022.

Valuation. The market is paying 1.38 times book value for VPX and 2.47 times for TCX — a 44.2% discount. This document assesses that this discount reflects three separable factors: differences in market share and distribution-channel tenure, differences in funding-tenor structure, and the degree of portfolio transparency. This thesis would be wrong if the discount narrows without any change in these three factors — in that case the cause would lie in share liquidity or index fund flows rather than in fundamentals.

§ 12 — SWOTFour groups of factors, each tied to a verifiable number

Strengths lie in capital and the ecosystem; weaknesses lie in funding tenor and portfolio transparency; opportunities come from remaining leverage headroom and market upgrade; threats come from the very mechanism that created growth — borrowing short to lend long.

Every figure in this table is drawn from earlier sections of this document. The four border colors correspond to the four SWOT groups under the document’s signal-color convention: green for a measured positive, red for a measured weakness, blue for an unrealized opportunity, amber for a threat to watch.

§ 13 — VALUATIONWhat is the current price assuming

At VND 26,250, the market is paying 1.38 times book value for a company whose 2025 return on equity was 10.5% — i.e., it is assuming either a higher future return than achieved so far, or that a portion of equity will be deployed more efficiently.

Source: price and valuation-index data as of the 28 Aug 2026 session.^[6] Red marks a level below the comparison basis. The pre-31 Dec 2025 P/B series is calculated on book value not yet updated for IPO proceeds and is therefore not comparable to the series thereafter — this document only uses the series from 31 Dec 2025 onward.

Source: daily valuation-index series.^[6] Color distinguishes the two entities and carries no signal.

Working backward: what return would justify the current price

With book value of VND 19,041 per share and a price of VND 26,250, the market is paying 1.38 times equity. Using the simple relation that P/B equals return on equity minus the growth rate, divided by cost of equity minus the growth rate, and assuming a cost of equity of 14% and long-run growth of 8%, a P/B of 1.38x implies a sustainable return of about 16.3%. This is a scenario, not a forecast; it depends entirely on those two assumptions, neither of which is observable.

Set that figure alongside the data: 2025 return on period-end equity was 10.5%; on the simple average of opening and closing equity, 13.9%; the company discloses 16.6%. The 16.6% figure corresponds to an equity base of roughly VND 21,500 billion — sitting between the two bases above and consistent with an average of the opening balance and four quarter-end balances. The company does not state its formula, so this is a guess about method, not a confirmation. In H1 2026, profit after tax of VND 2,169 billion on average equity of VND 34,767 billion annualizes to about 12.5%; using total comprehensive income instead of profit after tax gives 10.8%.

In other words: the current price is assuming the company achieves a higher return than in any year to date, and sustains it. That is not an unreasonable assumption — the IPO capital only arrived at the end of 2025 and has not yet been through a full cycle, and margin-lending headroom remains at VND 32,000 billion. But it is an assumption, and the condition that would negate it is: if the return on equity measured on total comprehensive income stays below 13% for four consecutive quarters, the current valuation has no earnings foundation to support it.

On liquidity. Average daily trading value of VND 25.9 billion against free-float shares worth VND 9,844 billion — it would take about 380 sessions to turn over the entire free float. For comparison: TCX VND 72.2 billion, SSI VND 487.7 billion per session. For a large position, this liquidity is a real constraint: even a correct valuation call is hard to execute at size.

§ 14 — GOVERNANCEA change of auditor, a smaller Board, and a string of intra-group related-party transactions

Within nine months, the company changed its audit firm, reduced the Board of Directors from four to three members through two resignations, changed CEO, and carried out a series of transactions with entities across the parent bank’s ecosystem.

Source: the independent audit report dated 12 Mar 2026 and the review report No. 26-02-00146-26-1 dated 14 Aug 2026.^[1][2][7] No emphasis-of-matter paragraph or key audit matter was noted in either report. KPMG states in the “Other Matter” section that the comparative figures for 2025 and H1 2025 were audited/reviewed by a different firm.

Senior personnel changes

Source: note 36.1 of the 2025 financial statements and disclosures on HOSE.^[1][5] After the April 2026 reorganization, the Board comprises Ms. Ho Thuy Nga (Chairman), Mr. Nguyen Luong Tan and Ms. Tran Ngoc Lan (independent). 2025 Board remuneration was VND 360.0 million, all paid to the Chairman; the other three members received no remuneration. CEO remuneration, salary and allowances totaled VND 10,321.3 million, split between Mr. Vu Huu Dien (10,079.8) and Mr. Nham Ha Hai (241.5) VND million. Supervisory Board remuneration was VND 1,586.9 million. The three groups total VND 12,268.2 million. Headcount at 31 Dec 2025 was 812, up from 582 at year-end 2024.

Related-party transactions

Source: note 36.1 of the audited 2025 financial statements.^[1] Red marks an expense item. Demand-deposit turnover at the parent bank in 2025 totaled VND 2,730,719 billion in and VND 2,726,697 billion out. The relationship with Fintech AI arises because the Vice Chairman of VPBankS’s Board is concurrently Chairman of that company.

H1 2026 continued to see dense intra-ecosystem transactions: purchase of OPES’s new share issuance (20 Apr), buying and selling certificates of deposit with OPES (11 May), a change in VPBank’s ownership stake in Pavo Capital (17 Apr), and approvals of contracts with related parties (14 Apr, 01 Jun, 12 Jun).^[5] No transaction was recorded as a related-party loan below cost of funds, and insiders hold no company shares, so no insider on-exchange transactions arose.

One separate event worth recording: on 15 Apr 2026 the company disclosed becoming a major shareholder of Kinh Bac City Development Corp (KBC), and on 02 Jul 2026 disclosed ceasing to be one.^[5] The holding period above the 5% threshold lasted about two and a half months. This is a large single-name proprietary position, consistent with the selective deal-driven investment strategy the company disclosed at its 2026 AGM. Public disclosure does not allow the profit or loss on this position to be determined.

We regard “steady steps” as discipline in capital management and resilience under every scenario, and “leadership” as the capability to coordinate the balance sheet and optimize resources to accelerate when opportunity arrives.

Director of Funding and Financial Business · 2025 Annual Report

Quoted verbatim as the company’s own description of its funding-management direction, placed here because it names exactly the two quantities this document measures, with opposite results: resilience (still thin on the tenor dimension) and balance-sheet coordination capability (proven through the pace of expansion).

LAYER 3Appendix

Raw data tables, calculation methods, source list, glossary and a revision log. This section is for reference lookup, not part of the main reading path.